Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis

I had to read this for school and was surprised by how much I enjoyed it. Robert F. Kennedy gives a firsthand, behind‑the‑scenes look at the Cuban Missile Crisis that feels incredibly personal and intense. It’s not just a dry historical account — you really feel the pressure and weight of the decisions being made. What stood out to me most was how RFK described the human side of the crisis — the tension, disagreements, and moral dilemmas the Kennedy administration faced. It made me think differently about leadership and diplomacy, especially how close the world came to nuclear war. Even though this was written decades ago, it’s surprisingly relevant to understanding modern conflicts and international relations. If you want more than just textbook facts, this is worth reading.

At the beginning of Thirteen Days, Robert Kennedy relates something of what it felt like when he and his brother, President John F. Kennedy, and several other high officials of the U.S. government first heard the facts. On Tuesday, October 16, 1962, experts from the U.S. Intelligence Community revealed to the group that the Soviet Union was building a missile base on the island of Cuba, and that atomic weapons and large missiles were already there. During the weeks leading up to that meeting, Soviet representatives, including Chairman Nikita Khrushchev himself, had consistently assured American leaders that they had no intention of sending surface-to-surface missiles or offensive weapons to Cuba. Remembering the moment when the truth became clear, Kennedy writes: "Now, as the representatives of the CIA explained the U-2 photographs that morning, . . . we realized that it had all been lies, one gigantic fabric of lies." There at page 27, I was hooked and kept reading to the end. What a riveting story, told so well. From there, Kennedy describes some of the initial deliberations of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (the "Ex Comm"). He tells about the competing recommendations they offered, which invariably led to the excruciating decisions that finally only the President could make. The first major decision took up the question of an appropriate initial response. After President Kennedy rejected the plan of a military strike and adopted the idea of naval blockade of Cuba, there were other questions to answer. Many of these were related to the task of striking a balance. On the one hand, it was imperative that the U.S. forcefully confront Khrushshev over the treachery and provocation of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, it was also necessary to leave room so that the Chairman could retain honor and respectability while backing down. As Kennedy describes it, this balancing act was performed by the President as he stood between the implicit threats from the Soviets on one side, and calls from U.S. military leaders and hawkish members of Congress for at least a strike, or even a full invasion of Cuba, on the other side. Kennedy relates a number of nail-biting episodes as the crisis unfolded. He tells, for example, about the President meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko two days after U.S. officials became aware of the build up, and how Gromyko denied any such activity. He also reports how, at his brother's request, he made a visit to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin who, like Gromyko, held to the same official line: no long-range missiles had been delivered to Cuba, and the Soviet government had no intention of doing any such thing. Kennedy gives the reader a good sense of what it was like for the President to hear from the Ex-Comm about every possible contingency before making day-to-day and sometimes minute-to-minute decisions that brought with them huge consequences. Finally, Kennedy relates the official agreement according to which the Soviet Union would remove their weapons systems from Cuba and the United States would end the quarantine and pledge not to invade the island nation. In addition to a sense of relief, I had several reactions as I finished this book. First, I was impressed at how well it is written. Throughout, Kennedy exhibits a crisp, easy-to-read style, the eloquence of precise and clear language. Second, I was struck by the consistent humanity of this unique story. For example, if they go on long enough, even the most grave circumstances get interrupted by humor and the ridiculous. The Cuban Missile Crisis was no exception. Kennedy relates some of this. For example, upon realizing that something would have to be done in response to the aggression and deceit of the Soviets, Robert passed a note to his brother saying, "I now know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor" (31). And I had to smile when reading the story of how, instead of traveling in a long line of limousines which would have tipped off the press, ten men crammed into Kennedy's car for a ride to the White House (43). Third, I felt suspicious whenever I sensed that Kennedy's own presidential aspirations and his natural desire to preserve his brothers' dignity overwhelmed the narrative. For example, he chalks up the Bay of Pigs debacle to a failure to solicit a variety of competing opinions. That action was precipitated by a unanimity of thought, says Kennedy, which closed off the possibility of a better decision (112). It also seemed more than a coincidence that Kennedy never mentions his official title, U.S. Attorney General. From beginning to end, he casts himself primarily as the President's brother, close advisor and assistant. An uniformed reader might be forgiven for concluding that Robert was the Vice President, instead of Lyndon Johnson to whom the author grants nothing more than a cameo appearance. Most of all, I was glad I had read this book. In it, Robert Kennedy accomplished exactly what he set out to do: to tell the incredible story of the Cuban Missile Crisis from his own singular perspective.

Robert F Kennedy's Thirteen Days is the first complete story of the Cuban Missile Crisis from a primary source. Spoken from his point of view, this primary source provides an excellent starting place for the study of the historiography of the crisis. RFK's book is a short, concise, somewhat biased view of the crisis from inside the White House. The book also contains an afterword, which provides an important analysis of the work. Robert Kennedy explains the missile crisis in its entirety in rather brief terms. Since his work is really just a personal recollection of the events of October, he is not compelled to, nor would he be required to, back up his information. As a primary source journal, this book is brief on facts but long on the human side of the conflict. RFK places emphasis on the feelings exhibited by the President and others. The best example, for instance, when, it is clear that Soviet ships will enter the blockade zone: "His hand went up to his face and covered his mouth. He opened a closed his fist. His faced seemed drawn, his eyes pained, almost grey. We stared at each other across the table. For a few fleeting seconds, it was almost as though no one else was there and he was no longer the President." RFK is also able to explain the mood of the close advisors to the President, in a way that a historian looking in on the event from some future date could not. Writing about the escalation of events and the weight of the possibility of nuclear annihilation, he writes "And there was the feeling that the noose was tightening on all of us, on Americans, on mankind, and that the bridges to escape were crumbling" Robert Kennedy, writing from the distance of 1968, is quick to defend the role of Adlai Stevenson, the US ambassador to the United Nations, for his suggestion, then very unpopular, but eventually adopted in secret, of trading the removal of Soviet missiles in Cuba for the NATO missiles. RFK then criticizes General Curtis LeMay for his insistence on a airstrike and invasion, ideas that were very popular during the unfolding of the crisis, and even after it was resolved. The invaluable recollections of RFK are the only source of information on what actually was said in these moments, at least until the release of the Kennedy Library Tapes in 1983. Robert Kennedy's primary source information in this regard gives an excellent, and exciting example of the real conflict that existed inside the White House, and the very real possibility that the view that armed conflict, followed by nuclear annihilation, was a viewpoint that could have swayed the President. In his 1999 introduction to the memoir, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr confirms the portrait of JFK at the time of the crises. Schlesinger writes that RFK portrays the President as `a remarkably cool, non-hysterical, self-possessed leader, aware of the weight of the decision...steering his advisers perseveringly in the direction he wanted to go." RFK's memoir of the crisis in October 1962 is an excellent primary source document where one can begin the study of the Cuban Missile Crisis. A quick, concise, if not particularly objective review of the events that transpired, (it was obviously written with RFK's Presidential aspirations in mind), Thirteen Days is an example of how a primary source can provide the first step of analysis of an event, as viewed by future generations.

RFK's cronological account of events and the decision making process is gripping, sobering, and terrifying. It should be required reading for all incoming presidents. The forward by Arthur Schlesinger is likewise full of insight but also interesting facts that came out years later (for example, the Russian troops in Cuba had tactical nukes ready to deploy against any invasion, yikes), don't be tempted to skip over it. The afterword, which is as long or nearly as long as the main book, meh. It trys to apply the lessons and issues of the crisis to the Vietnam conflict, which was current at its writing. Seemed mostly dry to me, though the arguements regarding degrees of congressional involvement in approving armed conflict were interesting and are still relevant. I confess that I began skimming through the afterword after the first 10 minutes or so of reading it. It would be interesting to read firsthand accounts from others in the "Ex Comm". I am sure that RFK was at least slightly biased with regard to his assesment of JFK's (and his own) performance, despite his genuine attempts otherwise. Overall: Execellent, and an easy, quick read,... highly recommended.

This was a short, but very clear and terrifying account of what actually went on in Washington during the Cuban missile crisis. President Kennedy was determined to have the Soviet missiles removed peaceably and set out to do so by creating a group of advisors called Ex Comm. This team was guided by Kennedy's admonition to give Khrushchev every opportunity to back down as possible. And during these days on the brink of nuclear war these were some key factors: some on the Ex Comm team advocated invading Cuba, some members switched positions from Hawk to Dove in a single meeting, President Kennedy maintained his regular schedule and the Ex Comm team met without the knowledge of anyone, a secret meeting between Robert Kennedy and Dobrynin negotiated a trade of U. S. missiles out Turkey for U.S.S.R. missiles out of Cuba, and so much more. Reading this book illustrated the true ability of Kennedy as a thoughtful leader, a keen student of history who was able to apply the lessons of the past to a modern crisis. It also illustrated the part that personalities and sheer chance played in saving our world from catastrophe.

It is just ok! I enjoyed reading it but it was way too dry

College course requirement. Great memoir from Robert Kennedy himself. Every history liver should have this primary source on their shelves.

Having just finished reading "The Last Campaign" by Thurston Clarke about RFK's 1968 presidential campaign, I decided to read "Thirteen Days". I bought some other books about the Cuban Missile Crisis, but wanted RFK's memoir and perspective about the situation before reading more current historical accounts. The first item that is a resonant theme forty years later is the ability of JFK to surround himself with diverse points of view and weigh all approaches to this stand-off before ultimately making his decision. This is in remarkable contrast with the current administration of George W Bush. However, RFK outlines the difficulty of individuals to even be honest with a President and the process that the select innner circle of military and civilian people went through -- no holds barred sessions without the JFK present -- that enabled them to outline the various options for him to consider. The second item that struck me was the simplicity of this memoir. RFK did not go into exhaustive detail, but gave enough "insider" perspective to (1) make people realize how close we were to the brink of world destruction, (2) outline the calm and collected approach of the JFK in the face of such esacalating tension. Why only a four? As with any memoir, there are certainly alternative perspectives that clearly don't get represented and covered objectively given the writer's bias and interest. For instance, historical records have shown that Kennedy did agree to remove missiles from Turkey as part of the negotiations with Khruschev -- even though this was delayed in order to ensure that there was no appearance of a quid pro quo. This does not diminish the value and perspective of "Thirteen Days", just reflects my opinion that it doesn't represent the definitive account of the Cuban Missile Crisis, but does provide the clearest inside picture of two weeks that the world came closest to nuclear annihilation during the Cold War.

Excelente…te pone en tiempo y espacio de los hechos y transmite los sentimientos reales de las periquete tienen sobre sus hombros la responsabilidad de evitar que el mundo entre en una guerra nuclear donde el país entero puede ser destruido…

In a fine analysis of a troubled time, RK does an account precise and, at the same time , sensitive of a moment of history when we were close to certain destruction; a time when the cold war was heating, and we almost felt the consequences....A must read!

Looking back at the Cuban missile crisis and especially through the eyes of RFJ is in these straitened times a valuable exercise in understanding how diplomacy can be played.

What a difference six decades makes. The last time the two nuclear superpowers were locked in a standoff, the world held its breath. In October 1962 a U.S. spy plane discovered the Soviet Union was secretly building missile bases in Cuba. Over the course of 13 tense days, humanity’s future hung in the balance as U.S. President John F. Kennedy demanded the missiles be removed and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev refused. In the end, Khrushchev agreed to dismantle the Cuban missile sites, and Kennedy agreed to quietly remove U.S. missiles from Turkey. The latter is described in Thirteen Days, Robert F. Kennedy’s brief memoir of the Cuban missile crisis (which was unfinished when he was assassinated in 1968). As hopes for a peaceful resolution faded, JFK asked RFK -- the president’s brother and closest confidante as well as the U.S. Attorney General -- to talk to Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador in Washington. In that 11th-hour private meeting with RFK, with whom he was already acquainted, Dobrynin asked about the U.S. missiles in Turkey. Earlier in the crisis the Soviets has formally requested their removal, but JFK had no wish to acquiesce to Soviet threats -- even though he regarded those missiles as antiquated and useless. NO QUID PRO QUO In that evening meeting with Dobrynin, RFK told the Soviet ambassador there could be no quid pro quo. “However, I said President Kennedy had been anxious to remove those missiles from Turkey and Italy for a long period of time,” RFK told Dobrynin. “He had ordered their removal some time ago, and it was our judgment that within a short time after this crisis was over, those missiles would be gone.” Earlier in the book, RFK says JFK had -- on several occasions over the previous 18 months -- asked the State Department to reach an agreement with Turkey for the withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from that country. “They were clearly obsolete, and our Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean would give Turkey far greater protection.” Although they were adversaries, neither JFK nor Khrushchev wanted nuclear war. Each was willing to be flexible and to allow the other to save face. COMPARE TO TODAY Contrast the sense of urgency -- and willingness to compromise -- in 1962 with how both Russia and the U.S. are locked into a collision course over Ukraine in 2023. Indeed, the roles are almost reversed. Instead of the U.S. protesting Soviet missiles in Cuba, 90 miles from Florida, Russia has for years opposed a de facto NATO presence on Russia’s border in Ukraine, a country through which Russia has suffered several catastrophic invasions. Hence Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine after its warnings went unheeded. The world’s two nuclear superpowers move ever closer to a direct conflict as the U.S. has poured more than US$100 billion into Ukraine to fight Russia. But unlike October 1962 no one seems to care about a looming collision of the nuclear superpowers. So RFK’s short memoir of the Cuban missile crisis is even more relevant today than when it was first published in 1969. The contrast between the key players in Washington today and the brain trust of 1962 couldn’t be starker. NO “MISSILES OF OCTOBER” Earlier in 1962, the most widely acclaimed book on the origins of World War I -- Barbara Tuchman’s The Guns of August -- rolled off the presses. President Kennedy, who had majored in history at Harvard, read The Guns of August as soon as it was published and grasped its lesson on how the major European powers in 1914 inadvertently stumbled into what (until World War II) would be history’s bloodiest war. The Guns of August “had made a great impression on the President,” his brother writes in Thirteen Days. “I am not going to follow a course which will allow anyone to write a comparable book about this time, The Missiles of October,” RFK recalls the president saying on Oct. 26. “If anybody is around to write after this, they are going to understand that we made every effort to find peace and every effort to give our adversary room to move.” LESSONS LEARNED So what was learned from the world’s near-death experience in October 1962? In Thirteen Days RFK listed some of the key lessons: --The time that was available to work “secretly, quietly, privately.” --“How important it is that the president have the recommendations and opinions of more than one individual, of more than one department, and of more than one point of view. Opinion, even fact itself, can best be judged by conflict, by debate. There is an important element missing when there is unanimity of viewpoint.” -- “The final lesson of the Cuban missile Crisis is the importance of placing ourselves in the other country’s shoes” “MINUTES AWAY FROM ANNIHILATION” The last time the world really seemed to care about the threat of nuclear war was the early 1980s. That was when Soviet and American experts agreed that such a conflict must be avoided. That conference is featured in the 1984 documentary “On the 8th Day,” which describes what would happen of only a fraction of U.S. and Russian weapons were unleashed -- even if only one side did so. And those weapons packed only a fraction of the destructive force of today’s nuclear arsenals. The current edition of Thirteen Days includes an afterword written in 1971, three years after RFK’s death. “Today,” it says, meaning 1971, “the explosive power of a single thermonuclear bomb exceeds the total explosive power of all bombs used in all wars of the past,” including the murderous 20th Century. “Today,” the afterword to Thirteen Days adds, still referring to 1971, “no point on the globe lies more than minutes away from annihilation by a ballistic missile.” World War I was called the war to end all wars, presumably to make the murderous bloodbath more marketable to ordinary people who paid the biggest price. But within a generation they were back at it, tripling or quadrupling the death toll of 1914-18. Given that Russia and the U.S. have enough nuclear warheads to end human civilization, a war between those superpowers promises to be the real thing -- a war that will indeed end all wars by annihilating the species that fights them. AN EASY READ This book is an easy read. The part written by RFK is only about 80 pages and is uncommonly well written. Simple words. Short sentences. Right to the point. No padding with colour or background. This firsthand account of humanity at the precipice is a priceless resource for scholars but could be easily read by teenagers. Obviously this isn’t an impartial account. RFK was writing about himself, his murdered brother and their close associates. This isn’t only one side of the crisis, it’s also only one side of the American side. Among the key players the only elected official was the president; Congress was informed rather than consulted, and then only as a last-minute formality. But no one can argue with the outcome: nuclear war was averted.

An outstanding preface and central content. I found the afterword a bit boring, but overall it’s a book worth reading and keeping.